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Taxes, Default Risk, and Yield Spreads
ABSTRACT
This paper represents an extension and integration of recent empirical
and theoretical research on default risk and taxability. The purpose
of the paper is to develop and test a model of interest rate spreads
which incorporates both the effect of taxes and differences in default
probabilities in a theoretically correct manner. There is an important
fundamental difference between our approach to explaining yield spreads
and the approach most commonly taken in literature. Unlike nearly all
of the previous work, we do not begin with a yield spread model, i.e.,
one which begins by examining differences in yields, butrather begin
with an expected return or pricing model, which can then be expressed
in the yield spread format. This is a fundamental difference in approaches
which we feel leads to a superior theoretical formulation which can then
be tested empirically without many of the problems inherent in thealter-
native approach. The theoretical model is a simple extension of earlier
work on default by Bierman and Hass (1975) and Yawitz (1977), altered
appropriately to take explicit account of tax effects. While thereis
a considerable literature that analyzes the effect of taxability onrate
spreads, we are unaware of any previous study that considerstax conse-
quences in the event of default, a rather surprisingomission.
Jess B. Yawitz Kevin J. Maloney Louis H. Ederington
Washington University Amos Tuck School of Washington University
Box 1133 Business Administration Box 1133
St. Louis, NO 63130 Dartmouth College St. Louis, NO 63130
Hanover, NH 03755Students of financial markets can't help but be impressed by the number
of new financial instruments that have been introduced successfully in recent
years. The fixed income market has been particularly innovative, as '1bonds"
carrying a whole host of specific features have been successfully marketed.
Bonds with small or zero coupons, variable coupon rates, or detachable
warrants are three examples from among an expanding list of such features.
In a financial market experiencing an influx of new financing vehicles
during a period of general interest rate volatility it is important for both
borrowers and lenders to evaluate properly the numerous alternatives. Not
surprisingly, there has developed a large and expanding literature attempting
to explain the rate spreads between different fixed income securities. While
this literature has addressed a broad range of Issues, callability [12] and
taxability [6,7,9] have been particularly Important questions.
The literature on rate spreads has evolved much as one would expect.
Early empirical work was in general not well founded in theory, and was not
based on an underlying expected return (price) model. Later empirical
research has tended to be more careful in its specification of factors
£.....A...A errecinyyieiu sprecisdflO,dS 6 consequerI.e, ue.ter iuuriueuiii viua'wii
theory.'
This paper represents an extension and integration of recent empirical
and theoretical research on default risk and taxability. The purpose of the
paper is to develop and test a model of interest rate spreads which
1An example of such an evolution begins with the important paper by Cook and
Hendershott (C-H) [3]whichestimates a comprehensive empirical model of yield
spreadstaking account of the effects of taxes, default risk, relative
security supply, and through a simply proxy, for callability. Building on C—H,
Yawitzand Marshall [12] reestimate their basic model, substituting a more
sophisticated measure of the effect of call that is consistent with the
general approach to option valuation. This more refined proxy for call
enhances the overall explanatory power of the C-H equation and revises their
conclusions about the effects of other factors on yield spreads.—2—
incorporates both the effect of taxes and differences in default probabilities
in a theoretically correct manner. The theoretical model is a simple
extension of earlier work on default by Bierman and Hass [1] and Yawitz [11],
altered appropriately to take explicit account of tax effects. While there is
a considerable literature that analyzes the effect of taxability on rate
spreads, we are unaware of any previous study that considers tax consequences
In the event of default, a rather surprising omission.
There is an important fundamental difference between our approach to
explaining yield spreads and the approach most comonly taken in the
literature. Unlike nearly all of the previous work, we do not begin with a
yield spread model, I.e., one which begins by examining differences In yields,
but rather begin with an expected return or pricing model ,whichcan then be
expressed in the yield spread format. This is a fundamental difference in
approaches which we feel leads to a superior theoretical formulation which can
then be tested empirically without many of the problems inherent in the
alternative approach. For example, later In the paper we develop and then
test a model which relates the municipal bond yield to three factors: the tax
rate, the probability of default on the municipal bond, and the yield on an
equal maturity government bond. Beginning with the pricing model, It Is
evident that these three factors enter the regression equation in a specific
multiplicative fashion that would have been very difficult to ascertain If one
had instead begun with a yield spread model. This distinction will be
highlighted at various points throughout our paper.
Of particular interest for our purposes are two recent papers, one by
Trzcinka [9] and one by Kidwell and Trzcinka [6], which are typical of the
most comonly used approach to modelling yield spreads between taxable and
non—taxable bonds. These analyses provide a useful Introduction to our—3-
paper. As Trzcinka correctly states, "If two bonds are identical except for
tax status, an investor will be Indifferent between them If the return on the
tax—exempt bond, Rm, is equal to the aftertax return on the taxable bond:
Rm =(1-t)R1
(1)
where t is the tax rate paid on the taxable return, RT".
EquatIon (1) has been modified by Trzcinka and others to allow for
differences in default risk by including an intercept term x that presumably
captures any differential risk premium between the two securities.
=x+(1-t)R1
(2)
When equation (2) was estimated by Trzcinka a shifting intercept technique was
employed to allow this risk premium to change over time. The Trzcinka
equation can be written as follows:
R =)+BR1 (3)
A positive value of has been Interpreted to Imply that In period t the tax-
free security Includes a larger risk premium than the taxable security. The
specific shifting parameter technique used by Trzcinka assumed that was a
random walk through time. Trzcinka then Interpreted the value of B as an-4-
estimateof 1-t, and used this estimate to test the Miller Hypothesis.2
Several comments are In order regarding the proper interpretation of this
relationship. Using what we feel Is a reasonable theoretical model to capture
the tax consequences of default, we are able to show that If the two bonds
have different probabilities of default, then B depends upon the relative
magnitudes of these probabilities and cannot be Interpreted simply as an
estimate of 1-t. It Is evident, then, that an estimation technique which
allows the risk premium for default to vary stochastically is theoretically
inconsistent with a stationary value of B. Stated alternatively, if the
relative risk of the two bonds varies over time, then both the constant term
and the slope coefficients In equation (2) will vary.3
In this paper we develop a simple theoretical model which allows us to
express the relationship between tax free (municipal) and taxable bonds using
a general linear equation.
RM =at+R1 +£t
t t
The key insight from this model Is that the parameters and are
specific non—linear functions of the breakeven tax rate and the default
probabilities on the two securities. When equation (4) is estimated using two
2Miller [7) hypothesized that in equilibrium thedifferential between default
free taxable and non-taxable bonds will reflect the product of one minus the
marginal corporate tax rate and one minus the marginal tax rate on equity
income. Since the latter tax rate Is usually assumed to be zero in tests of
the Miller hypothesis, yield spreads between taxable and non-taxable bonds are
compared to the corporate tax rate.
3It has come to our attention that Buser and Hess [2]attempt to modify the
results of Trzclnka by Incorporating the costs of leverage Into their
analysis. Their results and ours may be viewed as complementary In this
regard.-5-
risky bond yields, the non—linear restrictions implied by the theory allow us
to infer the ratio of the default probabilities on the two securities. When a
risky and a riskiess yield are compared, as in this paper, one obtains a
direct estimate of the default probability on the risky bond.In both cases
the non-linear restrictions imposed by the theory allow one to infer the
break-even tax rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I we
develop the analytical model of yield spreads. Sections II and III report the
results of a series of empirical tests of the basic model. In Section II
default probabilities are assumed to be constant throughout the sample period,
while in Section III this assumption is relaxed and default probabilities are
allowed to vary with overall economic activity. The final section presents a
discussion of the major implications of the paper and suggestions for future
research in the area of rate spreads.
I. The Default Model
In this section we present our simple model of the default process which
is then used to develop a yield spread relationship between various types of
securities. We initially assume that the probability that a borrower makes
the full contractual payment in the stated period, conditionalon default
havingnot previously occurred in an earlier period, is constant over time and
equal to P4. If default occurs, no payment is made.5 This specification is
4As indicated above this assumption is modified in Section III.
5This zero-one" specification of the return outcomes represents a
considerablesimplification since partial payment or renegotiation are
generallyalso possible outcomes. We do not feel ,however that this
simplificationintroduces a problem within the context of our risk neutral
framework since the zero-one outcome can be viewed simply as capturing the
expected value of the more complex payment stream.—6—
consistent with a model in which the probability function is stationary with
the conditional distribution of default uniform over time.
Using this model of the default process, Bier-man and Hass [1] and Yawitz
[11] have demonstrated that in a risk neutral world without taxes the yield
spread between a risky bond (r) and a risk free bond (1) can be expressed
(1+i)(1—P) as: e =r—i = (5)
p
While this result is obvious for single period bonds, it is less obvious
for multiperiod securities. As demonstrated by Yawitz [8], the intuition is
straightforward. The present value of a risk free dollar in year t is
simply (141)t• Given the default process assumed above, the expected value
of a risky dollar to be received in period t is simply pt(1+r)_t .Underrisk
neutrality these two quantities must be identical for all t. This equivalence
results in equation (5), which indicates that the yield spread between risk
free bonds and risky bonds with a stationary conditional probability of
default is independent of the maturity of the bonds. Given this result, the
remainder of the theoretical analysis employs one period bonds for ease of
exposition.
In this paper we modify the above result by introducing taxes into the
analysis of yield spreads between risky and risk free bonds. As we indicated
earlier, we were surprised to find that the tax implicationsofdefault have
notpreviously been incorporated into analytical or empirical models of
interest rate levels and spreads.In this paper the tax environment for fixed
income securities is modelled as follows:
(1)thecoupon payment iseither taxable as ordinary income or it is
taxfree, depending on the type of bond, and—7—
(2) in the event of default, no payment is made and the foregone
principal is immediately deductible from taxable income. Whether
a complete deduction is applicable (ordinary loss) or the
deduction is treated as a capital loss depends upon the tax
status of the investor and the length of time the bond was held.6
In the theoretical model below we allow for a distinction between the
ordinary income tax rate, t,andthe rate applicable to this default loss,
whether this is the ordinary or capital gain rate, by specifying that the
latter is a fixed proportion, a, of the former, where 0 <a<i.7Taking
account of taxes, equations (6) and (7) express the after-tax payment outcomes
from investing a dollar In risky bonds that have either a taxable or a non—
taxable coupon, respectively. Thus, equation (6) would describe a corporate
bond, while (7) would describe a municipal bond.
[1 +r(l-t)] with probability c
(6)
at withprobability
I(l+rM) with probability M
(7)
at withprobability 1-M
Throughout this discussion r's denote loan rates (yiehs) and P's denote the
6For individuals default results In a capital loss if the bond was purchased
more than one year prior to default. However, banks are always allowed to
treat default as an ordinary loss for tax purposes. The particular tax
treatment in the event of default that is impounded in the yields on risky
bonds will depend upon the tax status of the marginal investor in those
bonds. The empirical section of this paper attempts to identify whether
default is treated as a capital loss or an ordinary loss at the margin.
7This simple view is consistent with the treatment of capital gain under the
U.S. tax system.-8-
probabilityof payment.












Theseexpressions for and can be interpreted as follows: the first term
is the expected after tax coupon (interest) payment; the second term is the
expected after tax loss due to default. The absolute value of the second term
varies inversely with the. tax rate, indicating that for a given market yield
the possibility of default results in a larger reduction in expected after tax
return, the smaller the tax rate.
Yield spreads among the various securities can be derived easily if the
assumption of risk neutrality is maintained. We consider two other bonds, one
taxable, and one tax free, and both riskiess. The default free, tax free rate
of return is denoted by 1, while the default free, taxable rate is denoted by
rg (government bonds). Note thatfor the risk free, tax free security, its
expected return, 1 ,equalsi, while the after taxreturnon the risk free
government bond, equals r9(1-v) .Oneparticularly interesting exercise
is to derive the equilibrium relationship between the promised yields on
government, municipal, and corporate bonds, and the risk free, tax free
rate. Equations (10) —(12)express these relationships.
r = (10)
g—9-
rM =_i + (1—at) (11)
(1—P )(1—at) r= +
C___ (12) CP(l) PC(1—)
Consider first the municipal rate r .Ifaw=1 then rM =, Indicatingthat
M M
principal is completely insured by the tax code in the event of default, but
that the coupon payment is not insured. As atfallstoward zero, r must
increase reflecting the additional compensation required for the possibility
that a portion of the principal will not be recovered iritheevent of
default. That is, the lower the tax rate that Is applicable to a default, the
lower the "insurance coverage" provided by the tax code and the greater the
yield compensation required by investors.
Figure 1 Indicates how the tax rate affects the locus of yield-default
probability combinations for which the expected after-tax return is a constant
1. The figure is drawn assuming a constant value for a.Notethat for a
given probability of default, the yield required by an investor to be
indifferent between a risky and a riskless tax free bond varies inversely with
the investor's tax rate. Stated alternatively, the expected after-tax rate of
return on a given risky tax free bond varies directly with the investor's tax
rate. The intuition here is straightforward. If a tax—free bond makes its
promised interest payment, the realized after-tax return is obviously
independent of the investor's tax rate. On the other hand, If the bond
defaults, the investor's loss is (i—at) per dollar of principal since the
government bears at of the loss. The larger the tax rate, the smaller the
after tax loss In the event of default, and hence, the lower the required
yield on the bond. The fact that the investor's tax rate is relevant for
making comparisons among tax free bonds with different default probabilities
is due to the asynetric effect of taxes on the two return outcomes.If- 10-
paymentis made, the tax system is irrelevant. If default occurs, the capital
gains rate determines the size of the loss to the investor.
The above discussion has important implications regarding the types of
investors that will be attracted to risky, tax—free bonds. Suppose risky
bonds initially offer yields which plot on the locus of municipal yields with
=0in Figure 1. While the investor with a zero tax rate would then be
indifferent among all tax—free bonds, an investor with a positive tax rate
would have a preference for risky bonds, since the expected after tax return
for taxable investors would be higher, the greater the bOfldsS default
probability. This demand for risky bonds would Increase their prices,
reducing their yields. In Figure 1 this would tend to rotate the locus of
municipal yields clockwise. If equilibrium were to settle at the point where
the relationship between rM and (1-P) reflects a tax rate of .4, then
investors with tax rates lower than .4 would purchase risk free tax free
bonds, while investors with tax rates higher than .4 would purchase risky tax
free bonds.8
8Thfs clIentele effect can be demonstrated easIly using equations (9) and
(11). Suppose equilibrium In the municipal market settles at a point where
the breakeven tax rate is .Fromequation (11) the yield default
relationship will be as follows:
= + (1-a) (Fl)
Substituting into equation (9) yields the expected after tax return from
investing in municipal bonds to any investor.
RM PMr + (c-l) = I +cz(l—PM) (wt*) (F2)
According to the above equation the expected after tax return from investing
in a municipal bond will be greater (less) than i whenis greater (less)
than t.Inaddition, since the default probability is multiplied by the
difference between the two tax rates, it is clear that high tax Investors gain
more the higher the default probability.— 11—
Figure1 also portrays the effect of default on taxable bond yields. As
indicated by (10), the required yield on a riskless taxable bond varies directly
with the investor's tax rate. This effect is straightforward and can be seen by
moving upward along the vertical axis in Figure 1. The introduction of the
possibility of default, however, complicates the analysis considerably. From
Equation (12) It can be demonstrated that for given values of i and P, the required
yield on a risky, taxable bond varies directly with the investor's tax rate, i.e.,
or•
= 1
2[i + (1—a)] (13)
Two separate effects can be noted here. The higher the tax rate the greater the
yield required to make the expected after tax coupon payments on a taxable bond
equal to that on a risk free, tax free bond. This compensation is greater, the
greater the probability of default since the compensation for default risk (higher
coupon) is Itself taxable in this case. The second effect of taxes on the yield of
a risky taxable bond occurs through the expected after tax loss of principal In the
event of default. The higher the Investor's tax rate, the lower is the expected
after tax loss from default due to the "insurance" aspect of the tax code. However,
since the former effect must dominate even if the write-off is at the ordinary
income tax rate (a=l), the net effect on yields of a higher tax rate remains
positive (orc/ô) >0.Thus, In contrast to the case of a tax—free security, for
taxable securities the required yield varies directly with the investor's tax rate.
As in the case of tax-free securities, the tax implications of default lead to
a clientele effect for taxable securities as well. However, in this case the
clientele effect interacts with the default probability in the opposite direction.
To illustrate this, suppose the breakeven tax rate for all probabilities of default
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Substitutingequation (14) into equation (8), one obtains an expression for the
expected after tax return for an investor with a tax rate c.





Equation(15) implies that the expected after tax return will be greater
(less) than I when the Investor's tax rate is less (greater) than the breakeven tax
rate. The Interesting result, however, Is the implication of different default
probabilities. Note that as long as capital losses are not fully taxed
(I.e., a< 1)investors with tax rates less than the breakeven tax rate will prefer
less risky taxable securities. This preference disappears if capital losses are
fully taxed.
II. Empirical Results: Constant Probabilities
In this section we empirically investigate the relationship between two
particular bond types, municipals and governments. Our selection of a risky and a
riskiess bond allows us to obtain a point estimate of the probability of default for
the risky (municipal) security. These particular yield series are employed to
minimize the possible complications from callability. Governments are either non—
callable In the case of bills and Intermediate maturity bonds or callable only in
the last few years in the case of long term Issues. Munlcipals with an initial
maturity of ten years or less are not callable. The "Industry" norm Is for long
termbonds to be callable at $102, but with 10 years of call protection.
Finally this choice of yield series minimizes the measurement error problem
comonto yield spread studies. As is well-known, random measurement error in the
independent variable leads to coefficients biased toward zero in any least squares— 13 —
estimationwhile measurement error In the dependent variable does not result in bias
though it does lead to less efficient estimates. Yield spread studies, e.g.,
Trczinka [9], often regress municipal and corporate rate series for equivalent
ratings and terms to maturity on each other. Since both municipals and corporates
are heterogeneous and lightly traded, these series undoubtedly contain measurement
error and yield biased parameter estimates. Since U.S. government Issues are more
homogeneous and more heavily traded, this measurement error is minimized and the use
of governments as the independent variable minimizes measurement error bias In the
parameters.
Using equations (10) and (11) from the previous section, we can express the
appropriate equilibrium relationship between the yield on a risky municipal bond and
a default free government bond as follows,
(1—P)(1—ut) (1—s) r r= + (16) M V P
where v is the breakeven tax rate for this probability of default,is the
proportion of default losses that are written off as ordinary income, and P is the
probability of payment for the municipal. Note that although there is a linear
relationship between rM and rg according to the theoretical model of the previous
section, the slope and intercept of that relationship are both non—linear functions
of the probability of payment and the breakeven tax rate. In particular, It should
be noted that the slope coefficient does not equal one minus the breakeven tax rate,
as commonly assumed, unless the tax free security is also default free. Thus,
previous studies that make this inference underestimate that tax rate when the tax
free security is subject to a non—zero probability of default.
In this section we estimate equation (16) two ways. A regression analysis of
one variable on another can provide only two unique parameter estimates. Since
equation (16) has three parameters, one parameter must be fixed throughout the
estimation.The empirical results that follow Include oneof two alternative- 14-
assumptions.In the first case a Is assumed to equal unity for all maturities.
This implicitly assumes that the marginal Investor is allowed to fully deduct
capital losses from income for tax purposes (e.g. banks). These results are
contained in the unstarred columns of Table I. The alternative assumption is that
for all maturities greater than one year a equals the percentage of capital gains
(losses) that are included in taxable income.9 These results are contained In the
starred columns of Table I. A comparison of the results in the two cases should
shed some light on the appropriate assumption about this parameter.
Before turning to the empirical results some brief comments on the data and
estimation technique are In order. The data used in this study consist of monthly
observations of the yields required to sell new municipal and government securities
at par.'° The data sample begins in August, 1965, and ends in March, 1981, and
includes observations with maturities of 20, 10, 5, and 1 years, respectively. In
addition, the municipal bbnd data includes observations from three different grades,
prime, good, and medium. Thus, there are twelve separate regressions that can be
performed.
The estimation technique employed in this paper is an iterative non—linear
least squares procedure developed by Ralston and Jennrich [8]. This procedure
produces consistent (under weak conditions) estimates of all model parameters by
minimizing the sum of the squared errors. These are maximum likelihood estimates if
the error term is normally distributed. It also produces an asymptotic variance—
9mroughout most of the sample period that percentage was .4, but for some of
the earlier periods it equalled .5. Note that if a had not varied over the
sample period the least squares estimate of the slope and intercept and the
sum of squares error would have been equal to those for a =1(or any other
constant a). However, estimates of P andwould have varied with a in a
known manner.
10The government yield series were obtained from the Citibank Economic
Database, while the municipal yield series were obtained from the Analytical
Recordof Yields and Yield Spreads, published by Salomon Brothers.— 15—
covariancematrix for the parameter estimates which was used to obtain t-statisttcs
foreach estimated parameter.
The results in Table I provide strong evidencethat this model of the
relationship between a risky, tax free bond and a riskiess taxable bond is
appropriate. In every equation estimated the exceeds .987 and the t—statistics
are significant at the 1% level.'1 In addition the implied values for P andare
extremely plausible. Closer inspection of the results also yields the following
conclusionsand conjectures.
(1) In most cases the estimated probability of payment for equal maturity
bonds is lower the lower the bond's rating. The exceptions occur for
maturities of 20 and 10 years. In those cases the estimated P values
for good and medium bonds are virtually Identical.
(2)The behavior, of the probability of payment for different maturity,
equal rated bonds also tends to conform to the assumption of the
model.In most cases the estimated values of P for any grade move
verylittle as maturity changes.
(3)There seems to be little systematic relationship between the estimated
taxrates and bond rating. The estimated tax ratesoften increased as
onemoved from prime to good rated bonds, aspredicted by our analysis
of clientele effects, but decreased as one moved from good to medium
ratedbonds.
(4)There is a strong relationship between the estimated tax rates and the
maturity of the bonds. In every case the estimated tax rate for bonds
should be noted that the residuals exhibited first order
autocorrelatlon.Therefore, the estimated standarderrors used to calculate
thet—statistics are biased downward and the t—statlstics are overstated.— 16—
ofa given grade increased as the maturity was decreased. This result,
which is consistent with a market segmentation hypothesis in the
municipal market,'2 could also be due to the effect of callability
which ceteris paribus increases the 20 year municipal yield.
(5)The evidence regarding the appropriate assumption about aissomewhat
mixed. A comparison of the starred and unstarred entries in Table I
indicates that for 10 and 20 year maturities the assumption of fully
deductible capital losses (a= 1)results in slightly lower R2's and
slightly higher standard errors than the alternative assumption. For
the 5 year maturity the results are virtually identical.'3 Thus, there
is weak evidence that the marginal investors in long-term securities
are individuals rather than institutions. It should also be noted that
the assumption of full deduction for capital losses results in lower
estimates of the probability of payment than the alternative
assumption.
III.Empirical Results: Variable Probabilities
In this section we modify the assumption that the conditional probability of
payment is constant through time by allowing that parameter to vary with the overall
level of economic activity. Previous studies have argued that default probabilities
should vary with the business cycle. In this section we operationalize this
argument by assuming that the conditional probability of payment at any given time t
can be expressed as follows,
Pt =P+ 1Pt +t' (17)
12See Hendershott and Kidwell [5] fora discussion of this hypothesis.
'3Recall that for maturities of 1year or less capital losses are by
definition short—term and are fully deductible.— 17—
where%1P is the percentage change in the industrial production index and is a
white noise error term. Since investors are assumed In this study to be expected
return maximizers, the expected value of Pt will be a determinant of the yield on a
risky bond.If we make the additional assumption that either expectations are
static or that the percentage change In Industrial production Is a stationary
process, then the appropriate empirical relationship between equal maturity
municipal and government yields will be as follows.'4




Table II presents the results of the estimation of equation (18) using the Ralston-
Jennrich nonlinear least squares procedure. As in the previous section two
alternativeassumptions about the parameter aareemployed. These results are
contained in the starredand unstarred rows of Table II, respectively.
Theresults inTable IIarevery similar to those in the previous sectton.
Againthe R2's are quite high and the standard errors are quite low which attests to
the appropriateness of this specification. In general the specification of a
variable probability of payment improved the explanatory power of the overall model,
particularly for theshorter maturities. In fact, the coefficient and t-statlstic
for the parameter P1 Ishigherthe shorter the maturity.'5 Thus, this
14Eitherof these asswnptlons issufficient to ensure that
E(%IPt+j) —%iIP
for all j (F3)
15m1sprobably reflectsthe fact that the assumption that E(%IP+)
doesnot hold over long periods of time.
t i t- 18-
specificationseems to be better suited to maturities of five years or less. The.
behavior of the estimated values for v and P0 are consistent with the results of
the previous section. In particular, a strong relationship between maturity and the
estimated tax rate is still evident in the results. The relationship between the
parameter P0 and grade and maturity also mirrors its counterpart from the previous
section.
IV. Implications and Conclusions
The results of this study have a number of interesting implications. One
particularly interesting implication of the empirical results is that the yield
spreads among different grade municipal bonds are much smaller than the spread
between a prime grade municipal bond and a government bond, even after adjustment
for taxes. To see this consider the implications of the results in Table I for 5
year bonds. Suppose for simplicity that the breakeven tax rate is constant across
probabilitiesof default at .5, that the government raterg is 5%, and thatIs
.4.Using the estimated P values inthe starred columns, the following yields are
implied.
Pre-tax Yield After tax yield
Government Bond 5% 2.5%
Prime Grade Municipal 3.46% 3.46%
GoodGrade Municipal 3.56% 3.56%
Medium Grade MunicIpal 3.65% 3.65%
Note that the spread between the after tax yield on a government bond and a prime
grade municipal is approximately 4 times as large as the spread between the yields
on the prime and medium grade municipal bonds. Since the after tax yield on the
government bond in this example corresponds to the rate on a hypothetical risk—free
municipal security, this exercise indicates that prime grade municipal bonds do have
significant risk premiums embodied in their yields.
We would anticipate that one would find our conclusion that even prime rated
municipal bond yields contain a significant premium for default risk to be contrary- 19-
to actual default experience on such securities. In fact, the historical evidence
indicates that defaults on State and Local government bonds are not as rare as one
mightthink. We direct the interested reader to Hempel's [4] study of bond defaults
over the period 1839—1965 for evidence on this question.16
In summary, in this paper we have developed and tested a model of the
interaction of default and taxation on yield spreads. The theoretical model
although quite simple, seems to have a high degree of explanatory power. The
relationship between government yields and municipal yields was investigated
empirically. The parameters representing default risk and tax rates from the
empirical analysis are entirely believable. This strong evidence implies that this
model is potentiallyuseful for the determination of the interactionof default risk
and taxation in studies of the yield spreads between other types of securities. In
addition, future tests of the Miller hypothesis could be developed using this
framework.
161t has also been suggested to us that theseemingly large default
probabilities may be due in part to the market's expectation that municipal
securities could lose their tax exempt status before reaching maturity. To
the extent that this Is true our estimate of the default probability will be
biased upward.-20-
DependentVariable P SE R2
Prime 20 .425 .981 .0054 .9905
(19.56) (301.91)
Prime20* .439 .984 .0053 .9907
(19.61) (467.98)
Good 20 .433 .978 .0055 .9905
(19.36) (287.43)
Good 20* .448 .982 .0054 .9907
(19.43) (446.89)
Medium 20 .393 .978 .0063 .9889
(15.37) (264.06)
Medium 20* .406 .982 .0063 .9891
(15.31) (399.56)
Prime 10 .500 .979 .0042 .9927
(29.19) (327.29)
Prime 10* .507 .985 .0041 .9928
(28.43) (567.02)
Good 10 .496 .977 .0044 .9922
(27.33) (305.53)
Good 10* .503 .984 .0044 .9923
(26.58) (532.45)
Medium 10 .459 .978 .0052 .9905
(21.43) (280.59)
Medium10* .466 .984 .0052 .9905
(20.88) (461.78)
Prime5 .521 .981 .0037 .9932
(34.85) (370.20)
Prime 5* .521 .988 .0037 .9931
(33.45) (654.85)
Good5 .516 .980 .0039 .9930
(33.21) (366.47)




(t—statlstics In parentheses)— 21—
Dependent Variable P SE R2
Medium 5 .492 .979 .0046 .9915
(26.87) (311.63)
Medium5* .494 .986 .0046 .9914
(25.94) (538.20)
PrIme 1 .568 .981 .0045 .9879
(39.51) (346.12)
Prime1* same as above
Good 1 .567 .978 .0044 .9891
(40.32) (345.68)
Good 1* same as above
Medium1 .553 .977 .0050 .9872
(34.39) (307.42)
Medium1* same as above
Table I
(Cont'd.)-22-
Dependent Variable P0 p1 SE R2
Prime20 .429 .980 .122 .0053 .9907
(19.79) (295.66) (1.90)
Prime 20* .444 .984 .088 .00529 .9910
(19.85) (463.21) (1.96)
Good 20 .437 .976 .113 .00551 .9907
(19.58) (273.74) (1.71)
Good 20* .452 .981 .082 .0054 .9909
(19.61) (442.12) (1.76)
Medium 20 .396 .977 .096 .0063 .9890
(15.46) (257.98) (1.34)
Medium 20* .409 .982 .072 .0062 .9892
(15.41) (394.03) (1.37)
Prime 10 .505 .977 .189 .0040 .9931
(30.18) (324.30) (3.35)
Prime10* .512 .984 .122 .0040 .9932
(29.38) (572.32) (3.38)
Good 10 .501 .975 .184 .0043 .9927
(28.14) (301.76) (3.11)
Good10* .508 .983 .120 .0043 .9927
(27.34) (534.83)(3.12)
Medium10 .464 .977 .160 .0051 .9908
(21.85) (275.28)(2.43)
Mediu 10* .470 .983 .109 .0051 .9908
(21.27) (459.72)(2.44)
TableII
Estimation Resul ts: VariableProbability
(tstatistics in parentheses)-23-
DependentYariabe P0 p1 SE R2
Prime 5 .528 .980 .241 .0035 .9940
(37.06) (372.58) (4.64)
Prime 5* .528 .987 .150 .0035 .9938
(35.49) (674.46) (4.63)
Good 5 .524 .978 .246 .0037 .9937
(35.15) (352.98) (4.57)
Good 5* .524 .986 .154 .0037 .9936
(33.61) (641.79) (4.55)
Medium5 .499 .977 .208 .0044 .9926
(27.84) (307.23) (3.40)
Medium 5* .500 .985 .135 .0044 .9919
(26.84) (541.81) (3.39)
Prime 1 .578 .978 .374 .0042 .9896
(42.84) (347.62) (5.38)
Prime 1* same as above
Good 1 .577 .975 .385 .0040 .9908
(44.19) (350.18) (5.76)
Good 1* same as above
MedIum1 .563 .974 .392 .0047 .9889
(37.24) (306.98) (5.25)
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